Environmental protection mechanisms and technological dynamics by Antoci, Angelo et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Environmental protection mechanisms
and technological dynamics
Angelo Antoci and Simone Borghesi and Paolo Russu
University of Sassari (Italy), University of Siena(Italy)
2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36597/
MPRA Paper No. 36597, posted 13. February 2012 18:01 UTC
Environmental protection mechanisms and
technological dynamics
Angelo Antoci (University of Sassari)
Simone Borghesi (University of Siena)
Paolo Russu (University of Sassari)
Abstract
The paper proposes a new nancial mechanism that could be imple-
mented to protect the environment of a tourist region. For this purpose,
we investigate the potential consequences of two nancial activities, is-
sued by the local government (G) of a region R, which work like contracts
between G and, respectively, visitors of R and rms operating in R. Ac-
cording to these contracts, agents who decide to visit R (rms that decide
to adopt an environmental friendly technology) have to buy an option
that entitle them to get a partial or total reimbursement if environmental
quality in R turns out to be suciently low (high), namely, below (above)
a given predetermined threshold level.
Using a two-population evolutionary game model, we analyze the dy-
namics emerging from the model and prove that under such fund ris-
ing mechanism the virtuous equilibrium (in which all rms adopt the
pollution-free technology and all agents choose to visit the region) is al-
ways locally attractive. Furthermore, we show that the attraction basin of
the poverty trap equilibrium (in which no rm adopts the clean technology
and no tourist comes the region) can be decreased by raising the reim-
bursement oered by the local government to the visitors. Finally, using
numerical simulations, it can be shown that the dynamics of the model
may give rise to another attractive stationary state in correspondence of
the environmental quality threshold determined by the government, as
well as to a limit cycle that oscillates around the threshold.
Keywords: environmental protection; nancial instruments; techno-
logical innovation; evolutionary dynamics
1 Introduction
In the last few years nancial assets are receiving increasing attention in the
economic literature as a suitable policy instrument to achieve environmental
Address of corresponding author : Angelo Antoci, Department of Economics, University
of Sassari, via Torre Tonda 34, I-07100 Sassari, Italy. email: angelo.antoci@virgilio.it
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targets in terms of pollution abatement.1
In this paper we propose an environmental protection mechanism managed
by the local government of a tourist region that combines the potentially con-
icting interests of the tourists (who care for the environmental quality that they
expect to enjoy in the region) and those of the rms operating in the region (the
activity of which may damage the environmental quality of the region).
In particular, we propose the adoption of a mechanism based on two nancial
activities, issued by the local government (G) of a tourist region (R), which
work like contracts between G and, respectively, visitors and rms operating
in R - and can be regarded as (cash-or-nothing) environmental call (EC) and
environmental put (EP) options. More specically, the individuals' and rms'
choices can be described as follows.
A tourist who wishes to go on holiday in the region R must purchase the
environmental call option EC sold by G at a given price ep. This instrument
imposes a cost on the tourist if the environmental quality Q is suciently high,
that is, above a given predetermined threshold level Q, but oers the visitor the
possibility of a reimbursement in the case of low environmental quality (namely,
when Q < Q). One can immagine that environmental quality is measured by
some independent authority (e.g. a monitoring institution or a pool of scien-
tists and experts who collect environmental data in the region) and that the
threshold level Q is determined by the local government so as to safely satisfy
the carrying capacity of the ecosystem of the region. Consequently, the EC can
be interpreted as a self-insurance device that allows the visitor to \buy pro-
tection" against environmental degradation. Thus, potential tourists have to
choose between the following strategies:
(T1) visit the region R (and consequently buy the EC )
(T2) do not visit the region.
Similarly, each rm operating in the region R has to choose between sub-
scribing or not the environmental put option (EP) issued by G that binds the
rm to adopt a new environmental-friendly technology. This option implies an
additional cost for the rm given by the dierence between the cost of the new,
non polluting technology (cNP ) and that of the old, polluting technology (cP ),
but oers nancial aid as a reward to the rm for its eort to reduce pollution.
Therefore, potentially polluting rms that operate in region R have to choose
between the following strategies:
(F1) adopting the new environmental-friendly technology (and subscribing
the EP)
(F2) keeping on using the old polluting technology.
Hence, if Q  Q, the tourists (i.e. those agents who choose T1) bear a
cost but can enjoy high environmental quality in region R, while the rms
choosing F1 receive nancial support for their investments aimed at protecting
the environment. In this case, the costs born by G to nance the rms that
subscribe the EP can be compensated by the revenues that G cashes in from
1See Di Vita (2009) for an analysis of the importance that well-developed nancial markets
can have for environmental protection.
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selling the EC to the tourists. In this way, G can achieve the goal of improving
the environmental quality at a relatively low cost. If, on the contrary, Q < Q,
the tourists (who choose T1) receive a reimbursement for the low environmental
quality experienced during the period spent in R, while G can decide whether
or not to reimburse the few rms choosing F1 to induce other rms to imitate
them.
We will assume the value of Q to depend on the number of rms that sub-
scribe the EP and thus adopt the environmental-friendly technology. The gov-
ernment G determines prices and reimbursements taking into account, among
other things, the number of visitors and rms who purchase the nancial activ-
ities as well as the cost of the environmental-friendly technological innovation.
The aim of the paper is to study the dynamics arising in this context from
the interaction among economic agents (rms and tourists). For this purpose,
we introduce and investigate a two-population evolutionary game, where the
population of rms strategically interacts with that of tourists. The evolution of
tourists' and rms' behavior is modelled using the so-called replicator dynamics
(e.g., see Weibull 1995), according to which a given choice spreads among the
population as long as its expected payo is greater than the average payo.
The environmental protection mechanism proposed in the paper is com-
pletely innovative with respect to the policy instruments used so far and has
never been applied before. It joints the idea of the environmental bond (de-
scribed in the next section) together with a \satised or reimbursed"-like mech-
anism in which the unsatised customer can ask for refund of the money spent
for a given good or service. The latter mechanism has been applied to a large
number of goods and services in the market (e.g. tness products, cosmetic
products, house cleaning goods etc...). Surprisingly enough, however, it has
never been applied to environment-related goods.2
In order to analyze the potential eects in this context of the nancial op-
tions described above the paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews the
related literature, Section 3 introduces the model, Section 4 provides the basic
mathematical results. Finally, a few concluding remarks will follow in Section
5.
2 Related literature
This paper builds upon two separate strands of the environmental economics
literature: the one on defensive expenditures and the other on environmen-
tal policy instruments. The former research line investigates the consumption
choices that agents can do to self-protect from environmental degradation. The
ongoing degradation of many environmental goods leads economic agents to
2The only partial exception concerns special naturalistic tours oered by some tour oper-
ators, such as whale watching in New Zealand where the company guarantees a 80% refund
of the ticket if no whale is seen during the tour. This mechanism, however, is unrelated to
the rms' economic activity, therefore is completely dierent from the one described here as
it cannot induce any technological progress eect.
3
purchase private and costly consumption goods to satisfy the same needs that
were formerly met by common access natural resources, namely, resources that
were once freely available at no cost. The notion of defensive expenditures and
their role in enhancing the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the object of an
increasing literature that dates back to the seminal papers by Leipert (1987
and 1989), and that gained new momentum in the last decade when several
contributions (e.g. see Antoci and Bartolini, 1999 and 2004) showed that defen-
sive expenditures can not only increase GDP, but also give rise to a self-feeding
growth process that may lead the economy to a Pareto-dominated equilibrium.
This result emerges not only in evolutionary contexts in which agents have
bounded rationality (Antoci et al., 2008; Antoci and Borghesi, 2010), but also
in neoclassic frameworks with perfectly rational economic agents (Bartolini and
Bonatti, 2002, 2003; Antoci et al., 2005, 2010).
Like in the literature on defensive expenditures, also in the present case
agents self-protect from environmental degradation. However, the mechanism
proposed in this paper diers from the one examined in the literature on de-
fensive expenditures for three main aspects. First, dierently from the case
of defensive expenditures in which agents defend ex-post from environmental
degradation, in the present case agents self-protect ex-ante from possible envi-
ronmental degradation. In other words, under certain circumstances (specied
below in the analysis of the model) this mechanism may prevent environmental
degradation and the local government can actually inuence such circumstances
by properly modifying the reimbursement level. Second, while in the case of de-
fensive expenditures the agents self-protect by purchasing private substitute
consumption goods, here agents defend themselves by purchasing nancial op-
tions that allow for reimbursement depending on the realization of a given (en-
vironmental quality-related) state of the world. Third, while the production
and consumption of private substitution goods may sometimes generate further
environmental degradation (cf. Antoci and Borghesi, 2010, for a few examples),
the self-protection mechanism described here can improve environmental qual-
ity by raising nancial resources that the local government can use to promote
new, less polluting technologies.
The second strand of the literature that is closely related to this paper is the
one on the best policy instruments that can be adopted to reduce environmental
degradation. In particular, the protection mechanism analysed here shares some
common features with two nancial instruments that can be issued to achieve
a given environmental target, namely, the environmental bonds (EB) and the
tradable permits (TP).
As argued by Costanza and Perrings (1990), the EB is an incentive-based in-
strument of environmental risk control that can be conceived as a generalization
of the deposit-refund systems that have been applied in dierent contexts char-
acterized by environmental risk (cf. Bohm, 1981; Huppes, 1988). In particular,
the EB consists of a deposit that any agent whose activity may be environmen-
tal damaging has to pay to the regulation authority and that can be (totally
or partially) reimbursed provided the agent can prove that he/she avoided the
expected environmental damage of his/her activity.
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The idea of the EB - originally introduced by Perrings (1987 and 1989) and
subsequently further developed by Horesh (2000, 2002a and 2002b)3- shares
some common features with other policy instruments. In particular, the price-
refund mechanism underlying the EB is often considered equivalent to the joint
implementation of an environmental tax plus a subsidy. The EB, however, is
generally perceived as politically more attractive than these two alternative en-
vironmental instruments taken separately. In an EB system, in fact, subsidies
(refunds) are self-nanced by taxes (deposits), therefore -dierently from envi-
ronmental subsidies- the EB does not imply any worsening of the public budget.
Moreover, the prospective of a refund often makes the EB more acceptable to
public opinion than the environmental taxes, since in the EB the punishment is
proportional to the damage eectively produced and the refund is received only
by the agents who can prove to deserve them.
The nancial instruments proposed in this paper are similar to the deposit-
refund mechanism underlying the EB. However, they also present some dierent
and innovative features with respect to the EB that can improve the functioning
of the system. In the EB, in fact, the regulatory authority has to face consid-
erable monitoring costs to check whether the evidence brought forward by each
EB holder is actually correct and thus decide about the possible reimbursement
of the deposit. In the present case, instead, the local government has to moni-
tor only the aggregate value of the selected environmental indicator through an
independent authority. This may have a twofold advantage: on the one hand,
it lowers the governmental monitoring costs, on the other hand, it prevents the
EB holders from having to prove that they are eligible for the reimbursement.
The tradable permits, rst introduced and analyzed by Crocker (1966), Dales
(1968) and Montgomery (1972), are the other policy instrument that has some
aspects in common with the nancial options examined here. As is well known,
in the case of the tradable permits the regulatory authority initially allocates
permits among the polluters (users) of the natural resource on the basis of an
ecological indicator (e.g. carrying capacity) of the ecosystem taken into account.
Polluters (users) then trade permits among themselves on the secondary market,
leading to a market price for the pollution (exploitation) of the natural resource,
which signals the scarcity of the resource. Similarly to the TP, even in the
present case the action of the regulatory authority is based upon the information
on the threshold level of environmental degradation that is communicated, for
instance, from a pool of experts or a monitoring institution. As in the case of
TP, moreover, even this mechanism may generate an incentive to adopt a more
environmental friendly technology. In the case of TP this can derive from the
3Horesh (2002a and 2002b) proposed the auctioning of an EB that can be redeemed at
face value only if a given environmental target is reached by the agents. The target level is
thus determined by the government, while its achievement is left to the market. The price
of the bond will be determined by the market's evaluation of how likely it is to achieve the
environmental target. It follows that those who hold the bonds will have a strong incentive to
reach the objective as soon as possible since this increases the bonds' price and thus enables
them to gain the dierence between the face value at redemption and the auction price payed
at the beginning. In the last years, some authors (e.g. Gerard and Wilson, 2009) have
suggested possible applications of the EB to dierent contexts.
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desire to avoid the cost of purchasing the permits, while in the present case it
can be induced by the nancial aid received by each virtuous rm that adopts
a pollution-free technology if the environmental target is achieved. Such an aid
contributes to abate the costs of the innovative technology thus increasing the
incentive to invest in the environmental-friendly technology.4
The present paper extends and further develops the idea originally proposed
in two contributions by Antoci et al. (2007 and 2009a). These studies focused
exclusively within the tourists population, namely, on agents who had already
decided to visit the region and had to choose whether to pay an entrance ticket
or buy a nancial option. Dierently from those previous contributions, in
this paper we extend the analysis to the whole population of potential tourists
allowing for the individual preliminary choice between visiting and not visiting
the region. We then examine how this "upstream" decision aects the dynamics
that emerge from the model and how the resulting visitors' payo modify in its
turn the number of tourists that decide to come to the region.
The present paper, moreover, diers from other contributions in this research
line also in another respect. While other studies (e.g. Antoci et al., 2009b) do
not allow for any reimbursement to the virtuous rms in case of low environ-
mental quality, in the present context the government may decide to reimburse
the rms for their eort in adopting a clean technology even if for the region
as a whole the environmental quality target is missed. This mechanism avoids
that the rst clean rms that adopt the new technology get \punished" for the
dirty behaviors of all other rms and may induce the latter to imitate the vir-
tuous behaviors of the former, thus reinforcing the governmental support to the
diusion of the new technology.
3 The model
Let us assume that there exist two populations: one of rms that operate in
region R, and the other of potential visitors of R. At each period of time t
potential visitors and rms play a one-shot population game (i.e. all agents
play the game simultaneously). Each potential visitor has to decide ex-ante
whether to buy the EC and visit the region R (strategy T1) or not to visit
the region (strategy T2). Analogously, each rm has to decide ex-ante whether
to buy the EP and adopt the new environmental-friendly technology (strategy
F1) or to continue to employ the old polluting technology (strategy F2). Only
the potential visitors (rms) who decide to visit region (that adopt the new
technology) can buy the EC (EP). We assume that potential visitors know ex-
ante the criterion (specied below) that is used by the local government G to
x the price of the call option and the reimbursement levels, therefore they also
know in advance the maximum price that they might have to pay to visit the
4See Requate (2005) for a review of the literature on the incentives to the adoption of an
innovative technology generated by alternative policy instruments, and Coria and Hennlock
(2010) for a discussion of the necessary policy adjustments in response to such technological
change.
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region. Mutatis mutandis, the same applies to the rms. At the end of the time
period t, G decides whether to reimburse visitors and rms who bought the EC
and the EP, respectively, according to the environmental quality data in region
R reported by an independent agency.
We assume the two populations to be constant over the time and normalise
to 1 their size. Let us indicate with the variable x(t) the share of rms choosing
F1 at time t, 0  x(t)  1, and with the variable y(t) the share of potential
visitors adopting choice T1 at time t, 0  y(t)  1.
We assume that the price ep(x; y) of the EC depends on the proportion of
rms choosing F1 and of individuals choosing T1. We denote with erV (x; y) =
1ep(x; y) the reimbursement due by G to these visitors when Q < Q, where
1 is a parameter satisfying the condition 0  1  1. Notice that 1 = 1
means that the amount ep is totally reimbursed, whereas if 1 = 0 visitors are
not reimbursed at all. The latter case, therefore, corresponds to the traditional
entrance ticket with xed price that visitors have to pay to access some cities
or regions, while if 1 > 0 visitors have the chance to get a (partial or total)
refunding of the ticket in case of low environmental quality. Then, the payo of
a visitor buying the call option is Q   ep if the environmental goal is attained
(Q  Q), whereas the payo is Q  ep+ 1ep = Q  ep(1  1) in case it is not
(Q < Q);  is a strictly positive parameter.
The quality index Q is assumed to depend positively on the proportion x of
rms adopting the environment-friendly technology, in particular, for simplicity,
we assume Q := x. The payo of strategy T1 is therefore given by:
PT1(x; y) = x  ep(x; y) if Q = x  Q
PT1(x; y) = x  (1  1)ep(x; y) if Q = x < Q
where Q 2 (0; 1) is a parameter xed by the local government G.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that:
ep(x; y) =  + y + "x (1)
where , " > 0,  R 0 and  +  > 0.5
As the sign of  suggests, an increase in the number y of tourists has an
a priori ambiguous eect on the price of the EC. On the one hand, a rise in
y increases the demand of call options which induces G to increase their price
( > 0). On the other hand, an increase in y tends to augment the entries
available to G. As a consequence, the local government may decide to lower the
price of the EC to attract further tourists ( < 0). The sign of , therefore,
depends on which one of these two opposite mechanisms will tend to prevail.6
5The latter condition ensures that the price of the call option ep is always strictly positive
for any possible value of x and y.
6Observe that the price of the call option has an upper bound equal to  +  + " if  > 0
(when x = y = 1), and to  + " if  < 0 (when x = 1, y = 0). By properly setting the values
of ,  and " so that the upper bound is relatively low, the local government can attract
potential tourists and can use the revenues from the EC to reimburse the virtuous rms, thus
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An increase in the number x of non-polluting rms, instead, has always
a positive impact on the price of the EC. A rise in x, in fact, improves the
environmental quality of the region. To nance the larger amount of potential
reimbursements to the clean rms, therefore, the government tends to increase
the price of the EC, so that the revenues obtained from the tourists through the
call options can contribute to nance the rms that adopt the new technology.
Without loss of generality, we can normalise to zero the payo of individuals
choosing T2 (i.e. who decide not to visit the region):
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PT2(x; y) = 0
Turning now to the rm's decision process, the prots of a rm subscribing
the put option are given by:
PF1 = R(y)  cNP + erF (x; y) if Q  Q (i.e. x  Q)
PF1 = R(y)  cNP + 2erF (x; y) if Q < Q (i.e. if x < Q)
where:
R(y) are the rm's revenues, which are an increasing function of the number
y of visitors (and are independent of the adopted technology that is assumed to
aect only the production costs);
cNP > 0 is a parameter representing the cost of the non-polluting technology
plus the cost of the put option sold by G ;8erF (x; y) is the nancial aid received by a rm choosing F1 in case Q  Q;
2 is a non-negative parameter (2  0). If 2 = 0 then the government
refunds the non-polluting rms only if the environmental target is achieved. This
policy, however, can be perceived as excessively punishing by the rms that could
potentially invest in the new environmental technology (a sort of "rst-mover
disadvantage"), thus inducing them not to do so. To avoid this undesirable
consequence, in the model we allow for 2 to have also positive values, so that
the government may decide to reimburse the few virtuous rms that decided
to make the technological investment eort and are thus not responsible for
missing the target. In particular, if 0 < 2 < 1 the reimbursement is lower if
the environmental target is not achieved than if it is achieved. If 2 = 1 the
refund is independent of whether the target is actually reached. In this way the
virtuous rms are fully insured against the risk of being the only ones to make
supporting the diusion of non-polluting technologies in the region.
7Notice that the normalisation PT2 = 0 adopted here is a simplifying assumption that
allows to interpret PT1 in relative terms, namely, as the dierence between the payos as-
sociated with the alternative strategies T1 and T2. For the replicator dynamics assumed in
the model, in fact, what matters is the dierence between the payos associated with the two
alternative strategies, not the payo deriving from each strategy (see (2) below). The same
results would obviously hold in the model if we let PT2 be dierent from zero and increased
PT1 by PT2 (i.e. PT1 (x; y) = x  (1  1)ep(x; y) + PT2).
8To simplify the analysis and without any loss of generality, the cost of the EP can obviously
be set equal to zero. This would avoid that some rms with stricter budget constraints may
be discouraged from purchasing the EP due to possible liquidity problems.
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the investment choice. Finally, if 2 > 1 the reimbursement is even higher in
case the environmental target is not achieved since the government wants to
reward the rst rms that moved along the innovation path in order to induce
also the others to imitate their behavior.
If, instead, the rm keeps on using the polluting technology (strategy F2),
its prots are given by:
PF2(x; y) = R(y)  cP
where cP is the cost of the traditional (polluting) technology and it is: cNP >
cP > 0.
We assume:
erF (x; y) = + y + x
where ,  > 0 and  T 0 are parameters xed by G.
Notice that an increase in the share x of non-polluting rms has an apri-
ori ambiguous eect on the nancial aid received by each of them (erF (x; y)).
On the one hand, in fact, a wider diusion of the clean technology improves
the environmental quality of the region. This increases the likelihood that the
threshold level Q will be overcome, thus reducing the nancial resources that
G has to devote to refund the tourists and increasing the resources that can be
devoted to support the clean rms ( > 0). On the other hand, a higher value
of x increases the number of rms that are eligible for the reimbursement and
thus it lowers, ceteris paribus, the reimbursement at disposal to each of them
( < 0).
An increase in the number y of visitors has, instead, an unambiguously
positive impact on the nancial aid to the rms choosing strategy F1 (i.e.  > 0)
since G can use the higher revenues deriving from the EC to raise its nancial
support to the "clean" rms.
The process of adopting strategies is modelled by the so called replicator
dynamics (see, e.g., Weibull, 1995), according to which the better perform-
ing strategies spread within the populations at the expense of the alternative
strategies, that is:

x = x(1  x)(PF1   PF2)
(2)

y = y(1  y)(PT1   PT2)
We assume the parameters to satisfy the following conditions:
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C1) 0  1  1, 2  0
C2) cNP > cP > 0
C3) ; ; " > 0;  S 0;  +  > 0
C4) ;  > 0;  S 0
C5) + y +  > cNP   cP 8 y 2 [0; 1]
C6)  >  + y + " 8 y 2 [0; 1]
(3)
We have already described conditions C1   C4 before. As to conditions C5
and C6, they imply that, whatever the number of visitors y, if the share x of rms
adopting the non-polluting technology is suciently high (x  1), the strategy
F1 is more remunerative than F2 and the strategy T1 is more remunerative than
T2, respectively.
4 Analysis of the model
Dynamics (2) is dened in [0; 1]
2
, namely in the unit square:
S = f(x; y) : 0  x  1; 0  y  1g
and is discontinuous (if 1 6= 0 and/or 2 6= 1) along the vertical line x = Q.
In particular, for Q < Q (i.e. x < Q), the dynamics (2) is given by:

x = x(1  x)F (x; y; 2) = x(1  x) [cP   cNP + 2(+ y + x)]
(4)

y = y(1  y)G(x; y; 1) = y(1  y) [x  (1  1)( + y + x)]
while for Q > Q (i.e. x > Q) it is given by:

x = x(1  x)F (x; y; 1) = x(1  x) [cP   cNP + + y + x]
(5)

y = y(1  y)G(x; y; 0) = y(1  y) [x  ( + y + x)]
All sides of the square S are invariant, namely, if the pair (x; y) initially lies
on one side, then the whole correspondent trajectory also lies on that side.
Notice that the conditions C5 and C6 can be rewritten, respectively, as
F (1; y; 1) > 0 and G(1; y; 0) > 0, 8y 2 [0; 1]. Furthermore, indicating by y =
f(x; 2) and y = g(x; 1) the functions implicitly dened by the equations
F (x; y; 2) = 0 and G(x; y; 1) = 0, it is easy to check that the conditions
C1   C6 imply that:
1)     > 0.
2) the slope of y = f(x; 2) is positive (negative) if  < 0 (respectively,
 > 0); furthermore f(1; 1) < 0.
10
3) If  > 0, then the slope of y = g(x; 1) is positive and g(0; 0) < 0,
g(1; 0) > 1; if  < 0, then the slope of y = g(x; 1) is negative and g(0; 0) > 0,
g(1; 0) < 1.
According to properties (1)-(3), the straigth line G(x; y; 1) = 0 always inter-
sects the edges with y = 0 and y = 1 of the square S. Furthermore, when the
straight line F (x; y; 1) = 0 has positive slope, then it lies outside [0; 1]2.
It is easy to chech the following proposition concerning the stationary states
of the system (4)-(5).
Proposition 1 The stationary states with x 6= Q of the system (4)-(5) are:
1) The pure population states (x; y) = (0; 0), (0; 1), (1; 0), (1; 1), where only
one strategy is played in each population.
2) The intersection points (when existing), with 0 < x < Q , between the
edges y = 0; 1 and the straight line F (x; y; 2) = 0; the intersection points
(when existing), with 1 > x > Q , between the edges y = 0; 1 and the straight
line F (x; y; 1) = 0.
3) The intersection point (when existing), with 0 < x < Q and 1 > y > 0,
between the straight lines F (x; y; 2) = 0 and G(x; y; 1) = 0; the intersection
point (when existing), with 1 > x > Q and 1 > y > 0, between the straight lines
F (x; y; 1) = 0 and G(x; y; 0) = 0.9
>From the above proposition it follows that there can exist at most ten
stationary states with x 6= Q.10 These multiple alternative equilibria show very
dierent features. At some of them (the vertices of the square S, point 1 of
the Proposition above) all agents make the same choice within each population
(either all buy the option or none does so). At other equilibria (along the
borders of S, point 2 of the Proposition) a unique strategy is unanimously
chosen by all agents in one population, whereas heterogeneous choices emerge
in the other population. Finally, at the inner equilibria (inside S, point 3 of the
Proposition) both populations of rms and visitors present the coexistence of
heterogeneous strategies (some agents buy the options, others not). The next
Proposition identies which ones among the multiple equilibria described above
can be locally attractive and thus can be reached by the dynamics of the model.
The stability properties of each stationary state (x; y) with x 6= Q can be
analyzed by evaluating the associated Jacobian matrix:
J(x; y) =

(1  2x)F (x; y; 2) + x(1  x)Fx(x; y; 2) x(1  x)Fy(x; y; 2)
y(1  y)Gx(x; y; 1) (1  2y)G(x; y; 1) + y(1  y)Gy(x; y; 1)

(6)
It is easy to check that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2 According to the Jacobian matrix (6), we have that:
1) The pure population stationary state (x; y) = (1; 1) is always a sink.
2) The pure population stationary state (x; y) = (0; 0) is a saddle point or a
sink; in particular, it is a sink if F (0; 0; 2) = cP   cNP + 2 < 0.
9Notice that F (x; y; 2) = 0 and F (x; y; 1) = 0 are parallel lines.
10See below for an analysis of the case x = Q.
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3) The remaining stationary states of the system (4)-(5) are saddle points
or sources.
>From the above proposition we have that at most two stationary states with
x 6= Q can be locally attractive: (1; 1) and (0; 0). The former is a "virtuous"
equilibrium since all rms adopt the clean technology and all visitors come to the
region. The latter, on the contrary, is a "vicious" equilibrium: no rm adopts
the new technology, causing the local environmental quality to be low and thus
unable to attract any tourist. Notice that while the virtuous equilibrium is
always locally attractive, the vicious equilibrium can be so only if a specic
condition is met (see point 2 of the Proposition above). Such condition is
more likely to be satised if 2 is suciently low and will certainly be met if
2 = 0, namely, if no reimbursement is given to the clean rms in case the
overall environmental target is missed despite their eorts. This implies that
the local government should suciently raise the reimbursement to the clean
rms in order to avoid that the vicious equilibrium may occur.
The following proposition concerns the welfare properties of the two attract-
ing stationary states (1; 1) and (0; 0).
Proposition 3 Under the assumptions C1   C6, PT1(1; 1) > PT2(0; 0) and
PF1(1; 1) > PF2 (0; 0) always hold.
Proof. Notice that the payos evaluated in (1; 1) and (0; 0) are, respectively:
PT1(1; 1) =    ( +  + ")
PF1(1; 1) = R(1)  cNP + (+ + )
and
PT2(0; 0) = 0
PF2(0; 0) = R(0)  cP
Therefore, PT1(1; 1) > PT2(0; 0) always holds under assumption C6 while PF1(1; 1) >
PF2(0; 0) always holds under assumption C5.
As the Proposition shows, the virtuous equilibrium (1; 1) Pareto-dominates
the vicious equilibrium (0; 0), that is, the payos of rms and visitors turn out
to be higher when all agents buy the options than when none does so. Stated
dierently, the purchase by all agents of the nancial options proposed by the
local government would make everyone better-o.
So far, we focused attention on the number and features of the equilibria in
the case x 6= Q. As we will see below, however, the system (4)-(5) may admit
also other attracting stationary states (beyond (1; 1) and (0; 0)) along the line
x = Q, which are not stationary states of the system (4) or of the system (5),
but become stationary states under the composite system (4)-(5). Such states
are characterized by the fact that the vector elds of systems (4) and (5) point
in opposite directions in correspondence of them (see Utkin, 1974).
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In the next section we show through numerical examples the existence and
welfare properties of these other attractors that lie along the line x = Q in which
all strategies coexist, as compared to the attractors (1; 1) and (0; 0) in which all
agents choose the same strategy within each population.
4.1 Numerical simulations
We start by considering a numerical example with 1 = 0 (i.e. no reimbursment
is given to tourists when Q < Q) and 2 = 1 (i.e. the nancial aid to innovative
rms does not change when Q crosses the threshold value Q). Figure 1.a shows
the arrows diagram of system (4)-(5) in such context and Figure 1.b represents
the corresponding phase diagram. Notice that a bi-stable dynamic regime occurs
where only two locally attractive stazionary states coexist: (1; 1) and (0; 0); the
former Pareto-dominates the latter. Their basins of attraction are separated by
the stable manifold of the saddle in the interior of the square S.
Figures 2.a-2.b show the arrows and phase diagram that emerge from the
model when 1 = 0:3 and 2 = 1:2. In such context, the stationary states (1; 1)
and (0; 0) are still locally attractive but another locally attractive stationary
state P arises which lies along the threshold line x = Q. Their basins of attrac-
tion are separated by the stable manifolds of the two saddle points lying in the
interior of the square S. The stationary state (1; 1) Pareto-dominates P , but
P Pareto-dominates (0; 0). Consequently P is a second-best outcome generated
by our nancing mechanism of technological innovation.
Beyond the equilibria and trajectories described above, it is possible to show
that a limit cycle may also arise in the model. In this regard, Figure 3 shows an
example with 1 = 0:45 and 2 = 0:96 in which there exists a locally attracting
limit cycle LC in the interior of S; in Figure 4 the basin of attraction of such
cycle is represented. Notice that the threshold line x = Q crosses the interior
of the cycle; in such context, therefore, the joint action of systems (4) and (5)
gives rise to a cyclic behavior of the shares x and y. All the states belonging to
the cycle Pareto-dominate the stationary state (0; 0) but are Pareto-dominated
by (1; 1).
Finally, in the numerical example considered in Figure 5 we show how the
basin of attraction of the Pareto-dominated stationary state (0; 0) change vary-
ing the reimbursment share 1. As the gure shows, such basin shrinks when 1
increases, thus suggesting that by increasing the reimbursement to the visitors
the government may reduce the probability that the system eventually converges
to the worst equilibrium (0; 0).
5 Concluding remarks
The present paper sets forth a new nancial instrument that may promote
the diusion of an environmental-friendly technological innovation in a tourist
region. The simple mechanism proposed here requires: (i) that the government
establishes ex-ante (for instance, on the basis of the carrying capacity of the local
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ecosystem) the threshold level below which the regional environmental quality is
regarded as unsatisfactory for the tourists and (ii) that an independent authority
(e.g. a pool of scientists) measures the actual local environmental quality to
determine whether it has been above or below the established threshold over
the examined period. To x ideas, the threshold level might be determined by
the maximum amount of water pollutants discharged in the sea by the local
rms that operate in a tourist region. If water pollutants are above the carrying
capacity of the ecosystem (i.e. environmental quality is below the threshold) the
public administration reimburses the tourists for the disutility they suered from
the low environmental quality experienced during their holiday in the region.
Moreover, it may decide to reimburse the rms that use the clean technology to
support their virtuous behavior and induce others to imitate them. If, on the
contrary, the water pollutants discharged by the rms are suciently low (i.e.
environmental quality is above the threshold), then the public administration
does not have to reimburse the tourists but only the rms that adopted the new
technology for their eort in reducing pollution.
As it emerges from the analysis, the system admits multiple equilibria. If
the tourists pay a simple entrance ticket to the region (with no chance of reim-
bursement, i.e. 1 = 0) and the rms receive a constant subsidy for the new
technology (independently of the environmental quality achieved in the region,
i.e. 2 = 1), then only the extreme equilibria (1; 1) and (0; 0) in which all agents
adopt the same strategy in each population are attractors, while all other possi-
ble equilibria are saddles or repellors. The system, therefore, will either converge
to the rst-best outcome (1; 1) or to the Pareto-dominated poverty trap (0; 0)
depending on the initial share of tourists and rms that buy the options. In
the former case, all rms adopt the new technology so that the environmental
quality is very high and all potential tourists come to the region. In the latter
case no rm shifts to the non-polluting technology and none is attracted to visit
the region. In this case, the model can thus be interpreted as a simple coordina-
tion game between rms and tourists whose interaction is mediated by the local
government: if the agents of the two populations coordinate their strategies and
buy the options oered by the government they are all better-o, otherwise if
none does so they are all worse-o.
If, on the contrary, the reimbursement mechanism to rms and tourists de-
pends on the environmental quality observed in the region, then the trajectories
can converge to further equilibria beyond the extreme xed points (1; 1) and
(0; 0). In particular, the system may admit also an inner attractor along the
threshold Q or a limit cycle within the unit square along which the regional
environmental quality keeps oscillating around Q. This suggests that a more
ambitious environmental target set by the local government may favor the dif-
fusion of the innovation technology: the higher is the environmental threshold
established by the local government, the higher the number of rms that adopt
the new technology at the inner equilibrium.
As pointed out above, the system is characterized by a path dependent
process in which the initial distribution of x and y aects the probability of
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the nal outcome that may emerge from the dynamics of the model. The local
government, however, can inuence such an outcome and thus "direct" the
economy along the desired trajectory by modifying the reimbursements to rms
and visitors. In particular, by increasing the reimbursement to the tourists, the
local government can minimize the attraction basin of the vicious equilibrium
(0; 0), thus reducing the probability of ending up in a poverty trap.
Further research will be needed in the future to deepen the analysis of the
proposal set forth in this paper, its possible implications and the diculties
that may arise in its actual application. In particular, it would be interesting
to investigate the case in which -when the environmental quality is low- the
government not only fully reimburses the tourists for the costs of the call op-
tion, but it has to give them also an additional compensation for the disutility
provoked them by the bad environmental quality. In this respect, one could also
think of introducing multiple threshold levels (rather than just one as in this
paper) to distinguish between: (i) the case with extremely low environmental
quality (that is potentially health-damaging and requires therefore a compen-
sation to the tourists); (ii) the case of extremely high environmental quality (in
which the rms deserve a premium for their successful environmental perfor-
mance and the target consequently achieved) and (iii) the intermediate case in
which environmental quality is suciently high (low) in which only the costs of
purchasing the put (call) options are refunded to the rms (tourists). Although
at rst sight the rst two policies (compensation/premium to the agents beyond
the full reimbursement of the options cost) might look rather expensive for the
public administration, one could obviously take account of this problem by in-
troducing a balanced-budget constraint that the public administration has to
satisfy over time. Finally, in our opinion it seems desirable to investigate what
happens if we allow for a secondary market of the nancial assets proposed
here so that -once the put (call) options have been initially allocated among
the individuals of the two populations- rms (visitors) are allowed to exchange
them among themselves as it happens in the market of tradable permits. This
is likely to modify the price of the options and thus also the dynamics that
may emerge from the model, providing new insights on the potential risks and
benets deriving from the application of this mechanism.
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Figure 5: Changes in the attraction basin of (0; 0) (shadow area) as 1 increases.
Same parameter values as in Figure 2.
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